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This paper tests whether being convicted of a crime affects marriage market outcomes. While 
it is relatively well documented that crime hurts in terms of reduced future income, there has 
been little systematic analysis on the association between crime and marriage market 
outcomes. This paper exploits a detailed Danish register-based data set to fill this gap in the 
literature. The main findings are that male convicts do not face lower transition rates into 
partnerships as such, but they face a lower chance of forming partnerships with females from 
more well-off families. In addition males who are convicted face a significantly higher 
dissolution risk than their law abiding counterparts. 
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But the strangest of them all 
Was a friend of mine who spent his time staring at the wall 
Staring at the wall 
 
In his hand was a note that his gal had wrote 
And it proves that crime don't pay 
She was the very same gal that he robbed and stole for 
For naming her wedding day 
For naming her wedding day. 
 
Johnny Cash - the Wall 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The economic consequences of crime in terms of reduced employment possibilities and lower market 
wages have been shown to be quite substantial (see e.g. Waldfogel (1994), Freeman (1999), Western et 
al. (2001), and Holzer (2007) for the effects of incarceration and Grogger (1995) for similar albeit 
smaller  effects  for  arrestees)).  A  less  investigated,  but  perhaps  equally  important,  consequence  of 
engaging in criminal activities is the potential spill-over to marriage market outcomes. The purpose of 
the present paper is to take a closer look at this issue. 
 
There are numerous payoffs to forming and maintaining a partnership, and some of these returns are 
economic by nature. As listed in e.g. Weiss (1997), gains from marriage include specialization gains, 
the possibility of sharing public goods, of coordinating investment activities, and of sharing risk. To 
enjoy these benefits, a necessary condition is that there is someone who is willing to marry you. This 
paper investigates whether the possible stigma effect of being convicted of a criminal offence affects an 
individual's chances in the marriage market. This  paper  uses  a  sample  of  Danish  males  (since  males  by  far  are  the  most  active  in  terms  of 
committing crime) to investigate whether being convicted of a crime affects marriage market outcomes 
like finding a partner, quality of partner, and dissolution risk. An obvious empirical challenge is to 
identify  the  causal  effect  of  conviction  on  marriage  market  outcomes.  It  is  likely  that  individual 
characteristics, both observable in the data and unobservable, affect the process related to crime and to 
marriage market outcomes at the same time. To address the potential endogeneity of crime, I follow a 
strategy that has been used in (e.g.) the -- somewhat related -- literature that assesses the effects on the 
exit rate from unemployment of sanctioning unemployed individuals that do not comply with eligibility 
criteria for unemployment insurance (van den Berg et al. (2004), Abbring et al. (2005), Lalive et al. 
(2005), and Svarer (2007)). The method simultaneously estimates the process that describes criminal 
activity and the process of marriage market activities. It hereby exploits that timing of crime differs 
across  individuals.  Under  some  well-defined  assumptions  (which  I  will  return  to  later),  the  model 
causally identifies the effect of crime on the transition rate into and out of partnerships (Abbring & van 
den  Berg  ((2003)).  Another  empirical  cause  of  concern  is  the  possibility  of  reverse  causality. 
Difficulties in finding a partner or maintaining a relationship might affect the propensity to commit 
crime  and  hence  to  get  convicted.  To  address  this  issue,  I  supplement  the  timing-of-events 
methodology  with  an  instrumental  variable  approach  basically  using  pre  marriage  market  criminal 
activity as instrument for being convicted in the analysis of partnership formation and pre relationship 
criminal activity as instrument for being convicted in the partnership dissolution analysis. 
 
The interdependency between marriage market status and crime has been studied intensively in the 
sociological  literature.  However,  the  main  emphasis  has  been  on  the  effect  of  marriage  on  the 
propensity to commit crime. The conclusion from this literature is that marriage causally reduces crime 
(see Sampson et al. (2006)). Studies that look at the other side of the coin -- the effect of crime on 
marriage market outcomes -- are much fewer in number. 
 
Sampson & Laub (1993) look at the relationship between juvenile delinquency and adult outcomes 
using US data. They find that delinquency when young is associated with weaker attachment to a 
spouse and higher divorce propensity in adult years. Levitt & Lochner (2001), also based on US data, 
find no difference in marriage or divorce patterns by age 30 for youth criminals compared to non-criminals.  Lopoo  &  Western  (2005)  investigate  the  effect  of  incarceration  on  the  formation  and 
stability of marital unions, and using US data they find that the probability of finding a partner or 
divorcing the current partner is higher during incarceration, but not significantly so afterwards. Neither 
of these studies address the issue of endogeneity, and in that sense this paper is the first (as far as the 
author is aware) that tries to estimate the causal effect of crime on marriage market outcomes. 
 
The study uses a large Danish register-based data set to investigate how the incident of being convicted 
of  a  criminal  offence  affects  the  probability  to  form  partnerships,  the  quality  of  partners,  and  the 
partnership dissolution risk. The data has individual level information for 10% sample of the Danish 
population between 15 and 66 years old. For each individual we know whether the person has been 
convicted for a crime. The type of conviction and the sentence is also known. In addition, the data set 
includes  an  array  of  information  on  partnership  start  and  dissolution  and  various  socioeconomic 
variables for all individuals, their partners, and the parents of both individuals in a given couple. The 
sample is observed from 1990-2003. 
 
We show that being convicted is associated with a reduced probability of being in a relationship.  We 
find that being convicted does not affect the transition rate into partnerships as such, but males who 
have been convicted face a lower chance of forming partnerships with females from more well-off 
families, suggesting that crime does carry a penalty in terms of forming partnerships. In relation to 
partnership  dissolution,  it  is  found  that  males  who  are  being  convicted  face  a  significantly  higher 
dissolution risk than their law abiding counterparts. 
 
The structure of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide a brief discussion of the expected 
association between crime and marriage market outcome. Section 3 presents the data, and details on 
sample selection. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and in particular under which assumptions 
inference is obtained. In Section 5, the results are presented, and finally in Section 6 I conclude. 
 2  The association between crime and marriage market 
outcomes
1 
In the classical economic framework, individuals commit crime when the expected gain from doing so 
exceeds the expected cost of punishment (see e.g. Becker (1968)). Related to the marriage market a 
possible return from committing crime is that it can raise individual income and thereby serve as a tool 
to  become  more  attractive  as  romantic  partner.  The  marriage  market  literature  finds  that  males' 
attractiveness is positively associated with income and labour market attachment (see e.g. Gautier et al. 
(2005) and Svarer (2007)). It has, however, been shown that there exists a real cost of being caught and 
subsequently punished for a crime related to subsequent labour market success (see e.g. Waldfogel 
(1994), Freeman (1999), Western et al. (2001), and Holzer (2007)), but it is not obvious whether this is 
also the case when it comes to the marriage market. However, it follows that males who have been 
convicted  might  face  lower  chances  of  attracting  a  partner  and  perhaps  especially  a  high  quality 
partner. Likewise, males who are found guilty of a felony and who are already in a partnership face the 
risk that their partners reassess the value of the partnership and realise that it has decreased and thus 
choose to leave the partnership. The empirical divorce literature almost consistently finds that males 
who experience a major drop in income have increased dissolution risks (e.g. Weiss & Willis (1997) 
and Svarer (2005)). On the other hand, income prospects might not be the only trait that females 
evaluate when they decide on who to admire romantically. 
 
Turning an eye to the sociological literature and in particular drawing on social learning theory, it 
might be the case that delinquency and risk-taking behaviour in general might be seen as evidence of 
qualities such as nerve and bravery, which, as pointed out in Rebellon & Manasse (2004), might attract 
potential romantic partners.  
 
In the criminological literature the rational choice explanation for criminal activity does not receive as 
much  support  as  in  the  economic  literature  (see  e.g.  Gottfredson  &  Hirschi  (1992)  and  McCarthy 
                                                 
1 I focus entirely on male criminality in this paper. Hence, the following only view the gains and costs 
from delinquency from the male perspective. 
 (2002)). As pointed out in e.g. Leung & Brittain (2009) more focus is attributed to factors such as 
social structure, theories of strain, and cultural deviance to explain why people commit crime. Related 
to the current studies there might therefore be confounders that both affect the propensity to commit 
crime and the propensity to form partnerships that are not observable in the data. This should be taking 
into account when the results are interpreted. 
 
The remainder of the paper  contributes with an empirical investigation of the association between 
crime and marriage market outcomes. 
 
3  Data 
 
The data used in this study arise from two different registers. First, we use a data base maintained by 
Statistics  Denmark  with  information  on  demographic  and  socioeconomic  characteristics  for  a  10% 
sample of the Danish population between 15 and 66 years old is subtracted from IDA. The sample is 
observed from 1990-2003. The information is on an individual basis and is register-based. Since each 
inhabitant in Denmark has a social security number we can merge the data with data from the crime 
registers.  The  crime  register  is  maintained  by  the  Ministry  of  Justice.  In  the  crime  register  all 
individuals who are convicted for a crime are registered.  By merging the two data sets we have at the 
individual level information about transitions in the marriage market together  with information on 
convictions and a range of socioeconomic variables. The crime register also contain information for the 
exact date of a given conviction, the type of felony for which the conviction is given, and the sentence 
type. 
 
I only focus on criminal activities conducted by males. Males commit more than 80% of (solved) 
crimes in Denmark (source: Statistics Denmark, 2005), and since I intend to model crime behaviour, 
female criminal activity will be too low to give precise results.  
 
In the remaining part of the data section, I first give a short overview of criminal activity in Denmark. 
Second, I discuss sample selection and choice of explanatory variables in relation to the three sets of analyses that are carried out in this paper. I first look at the association between being convicted and 
being in a partnership. In this analysis I use information for all individuals in all years in a simple fixed 
effect panel data model where the dependent variable is the probability of being in partnership in a 
given year. Here I do not address the potential endogeneity of convictions. This exercise is supposed to 
provide  a  preliminary  picture  of  the  association  between  convictions  and  partnerships.  In  the  two 
subsequent analyses  I more carefully address the issue of endogeneity. First I consider how crime 
affects the transition rate into partnerships and the quality of partners. Subsequently, I investigate how 
crime affects the dissolution risk of partnerships. 
 
3.1  Criminal activity in Denmark - some numbers 
 
To get an impression of the amount of crime in Denmark compared to other countries, I use data from 
the Seventh United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
2 
 
The most recent US figures are from 1999, and I therefore base the comparison on 1999 numbers. 
Below, I report the total number of recorded crimes in the US, England & Wales, and Denmark. In 
addition, I report some numbers by type of crime. 
 
  Rate per 100,000 inhabitants, 1999 
  Denmark  US  England & Wales 
Grand total of recorded crime  9,291.31  8,571.19  10,061.11 
Total recorded intentional homicide, completed  0.98    4.55  1.45 
Total recorded burglaries  1,896.90  755.29  1,721.33 
Total recorded drug offences  15.60  231.29  560.11 
Total recorded thefts  3,443.18  2,502.66  3,357.60 
 
                                                 
2 See http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_survey_seventh.html 
 The figures presented above suggest that the crime rate is not lower in Denmark compared to countries 
like England & Wales and the US, but the crime pattern varies somewhat. The US has a remarkably 
higher homicide rate and more drug offences than the two other countries, whereas burglaries and 
thefts are more pronounced in the European examples. 
 
In Figure 1, I present the age specific crime rate for 2003 for Denmark. The figure shows the fraction in 
each age group that has been convicted of a crime in 2003. 
 
Figure1 about here 
 
Figure 1 confirms that a non-negligible number of individuals are found guilty of criminal felonies. The 
age pattern suggests that the propensity to commit crime dies out when individuals grow older and 
peaks around the age of 18 (see e.g. Levitt & Lochner (2001) and Freeman (1999) for similar age 
patterns for the US). 
 
3.1  Data for the analysis of being in partnership 
 
Data for the first analysis is collected by sampling all males that are between 18 and 22 years old in 
1990. They  are then followed to 2003.  For  each  year  I observe their  marriage market status.  The 
dependent variable is whether they in a given year are in a partnership. A partnership can take the form 
of legal marriage or cohabitation. The latter partnership form is widely used in Denmark, and of those 
who  marry,  more  than  80%  premaritally  cohabit  (see  e.g.  Svarer  (2004)).  Since  data  on  marriage 
market behaviour come from register data, I have no information on partnerships that do not entail 
shared housing (i.e. dating is not observed).  
 
I  use  information  on  convictions  and  in  addition  I  investigate  whether  different  types  of  criminal 
activities and sentences are associated with the partnership status. Specifically, I look at the following 
crime classifications: violence, property and others (which include sexual offences and drug crimes) 
and the following four types of sentences: mandatory prison sentence, suspended prison sentence, fine, and community service plus other sentences
3. I do not include traffic crimes in the analysis. Descriptive 
statistics for these variables are presented alongside the explanatory variables in Table 1. 
 
I also investigate whether different types of criminal activities and sentences have different effects on 
partnership formation. Specifically, I look at the following crime classifications: violence, property and 
others (which include sexual offences and drug crimes) and the following four types of sentences: 
mandatory  prison  sentence,  suspended  prison  sentence,  fine,  and  community  service  plus  other 
sentences
4. I do not include traffic crimes in the analysis. Descriptive statistics for the crime variables 
are presented in Table 1. 
 
  Table 1 about here 
 
As is seen in Table 1 there are a substantial number of men that are convicted more than ones in the 
time period I investigate. To get a picture of the association between different types of crimes I present 
in Table 2 the fraction of those who have been convicted for a given crime that also have a conviction 
for another type of crime. 
 
  Table 2 about here 
                                                 
3 In some cases, more sentences are issued simultaneously, i.e. a male can get a suspended sentence and 
a fine. In the following, I record types of sentences according to how severe they are. A mandatory 
prison  sentence  is  assumed  to  be  the  toughest  followed  be  suspended  prison  sentence,  fines  and 
community service plus other sentences. That is, in the example mentioned above the male will be 
recorded with a suspended prison sentence. 
 
4 In some cases, more sentences are issued simultaneously, i.e. a male can get a suspended sentence and 
a fine. In the following, I record types of sentences according to how severe they are. A mandatory 
prison  sentence  is  assumed  to  be  the  toughest  followed  be  suspended  prison  sentence,  fines  and 
community service plus other sentences. That is, in the example mentioned above the male will be 
recorded with a suspended prison sentence. 
 It is clear from Table 2 that those who commit crime and get convicted are active on more than one 
arena. Of those who have a conviction for violence more than half also have a conviction for property 
crime. 
 
3.2  Data for partnership formation analysis 
 
Data for partnership formation is collected by sampling all males as they enter the marriage market. I 
assume that this occurs at age 18, and I consequently flow sample all males when they turn 18. I then 
follow  them  through  time  until  they  either  form  a  partnership  or  the  sampling  period  ends.  The 
sampling  framework  has  the  advantage  that  I  do  not  have  to  model  left  censored  partnership 
observation since the incident of partnership is non-existing before individuals turn 18. I measure the 
time until a male gets formally married or shares a housing unit with a female
5. Dates of both occasions 
are given on a daily basis in the registers. 
 
In the subsequent empirical analysis, I investigate whether being convicted affects the transition rate 
into partnership
6. I only look at the effect of the first conviction. That is, I do not investigate the 
                                                 
5 Notice that this implies that individuals who are sharing housing without having a real partnership are 
registered as cohabitors. In circumstances where the age difference is larger than 15 years or the two 
individuals are biologically related, they are not registered as cohabitors. I have no further information 
that enables me to disentangle these observations from true partnerships. On the other hand, they are 
presumably few in number and the alternative is to ignore cohabitations. I am reluctant to follow this 
strategy since cohabitation is by far the most frequent partnership type, especially among the younger 
cohorts in Denmark. 
 
6 I use convictions as indicators of crime. Alternatively, I could have investigated how both charges and 
convictions  affect  marriage  market  behaviour.  There  are  a  number  of  arguments  for  focusing  on 
convictions only. First, convictions might be more visible to the market than charges (that might be 
dropped) and therefore more likely to cause a change in marriage market possibilities. Second, the 
empirical investigation is kept more tractable when only convictions are endogenized. Anyway, results marginal effect of subsequent convictions for the same individual. This approach is similar to  the 
literature on the effect of UI benefit payment sanctions on the exit rate from unemployment (see van 
den Berg et al. (2004), Abbring et al. (2005), Lalive et al. (2005), and Svarer (2007)), and has the 
advantage that the empirical model becomes more tractable. The strategy is, however, not completely 
innocuous since, as will become clear later, many males who have been convicted once get convicted 
again.  Preferably,  the  empirical  model  should  allow  for  multiple  convictions.  However,  the 
econometric literature is not sufficiently developed to address the endogeneity issues that arise in these 
situations, and therefore  I follow the route of  many predecessors and  consider the first conviction 
(event) only. In the current context the empirical strategy probably works well in the main part of the 
paper where I compare marriage market outcomes of convicted to non-convicted. The drawbacks of the 
empirical model are more serious when I look at the effects of different crime types and sentences. By 
restricting focus to the first conviction, I risk measuring the effect of the least serious crime and the 
mildest sentence. I will return to these issues when I interpret my results in section 5. 
 
To  account  for  confounding  characteristics  of  the  individuals,  I  include  a  number  of  explanatory 
variables.  In  addition,  I  analyse  whether  a  criminal  conviction  affects  the  quality  of  the  marriage 
partner.  Unfortunately,  the  data  do  not  contain  information  on  beauty,  weight,  IQ  or  other 
characteristics that could be used to assess the attractiveness of females. I therefore follow the strategy 
in Gautier et al. (2005) and use income and educational level as measures of attractiveness. Since 
individuals in the sample typically match when they are quite young, and therefore before they have 
completed an education and entered the labour market, I use information on the fathers of the females 
as a proxy for quality of females
7. I use the following information to proxy quality (all measured at the 
year of partnership start): a dummy for whether the wealth of the father is in the top 50% of the wealth 
distribution, a dummy for whether the disposable income of the father is in the top 50% of the income 
                                                                                                                                                                        
from an empirical model where both charges and convictions are modelled (along the lines of Lalive et 
al. (2005)) provide the same main conclusions as the current analysis. 
 
7 Chadwick & Solon (2002) present evidence that the intergenerational transmission of income status 
between fathers and daughters is quite substantial. 
 distribution,  and  a  dummy  for  whether  the  father  has  completed  a  medium-  or  long-term  further 
education. 
 
3.3  Explanatory variables 
 
In the subsequent analysis, the following variables are included: age; children, an indicator variable 
taking the value 1 if the individual has children, student, an indicator for currently attending school; 
work, indicator if the individual is currently working (the reference category for school or work is 
unemployed);  gross  income  is  the  sum  of  personal  income,  capital  income,  housing  benefit,  child 
support, and tax free retirement subsidies and is inflated to 2003 price level using the official wage 
deflator published by Statistic Denmark, unemployment rate, gives the annual average unemployment 
rate; wealth father, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the father of the male has a level of wealth in 
the top 50% of the wealth distribution; and educated father, which is an indicator variable that takes the 
value 1 if the father has completed a medium- or long-term further education. Again, the latter two 
variables are included to reflect the marriage quality of the male who has not yet been able to signal his 
earnings potential in the labour market. 
 
All variables are time-varying and updated on an annual basis. The explanatory variables are included 
both in a model for partnership formation and in a model that estimates the time until an individual is 
convicted. In the latter model I also include an indicator variable, convicted before 18, that takes the 
value 1 if the person has received a conviction prior to his 18th birthday, and educated mother, which is 
an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the mother has completed a medium- or long-term further 
education. Table 3 gives descriptive statistics for the data set used. In total, I observe 32170 young men 
from the age of 18 until they either form a partnership or the observation period ends. I disregard 
observations for which there are missing information on the included variables in the analysis, which 
primarily is due to missing information on parent’s characteristics. 
 
  Table 3 about here 
 Table 3 shows that around 10% of the males get convicted during the observation period, which again 
indicates that criminal activity is not a rare event among Danish youths. To supplement this, around 4% 
of the sample was convicted before they turned 18. Most crimes are property crime followed by violent 
crimes. The convictions typically result in a fine or community service
8. Very few of the young men in 
the sample get a mandatory prison sentence. Around 49% of the individuals form a partnership during 
the period, and the mean age at which this happens is 22. 
 
3.4  Data for partnership dissolution analysis 
 
Data for the partnership dissolution analysis is obtained by flow sampling all relationships that start in 
the sampling period. The main objective of this analysis is to investigate whether being convicted 
affects the length of a given relationship. Information on convictions is similar to the data set used in 
the partnership formation analysis. 
 
The included explanatory variables are: age; for both partners; children, an indicator variable taking the 
value 1 if the couple has children; working, indicator for whether either of the spouses work; man 
older/woman older, indicator for whether the age difference is larger than 4 years (in both directions); 
gross income, for both individuals in the couple the sum of personal income, capital income, housing 
benefit, child support, and tax free retirement subsidies is included, and numbers are inflated to 2003 
price level using the official wage deflator published by Statistic Denmark; married, an indicator for 
whether the couple is formally married or cohabiting; low education, indicator for whether the highest 
completed  educational  level  of  either  person  is  lower  than  vocational  training;,  high  education, 
indicator for whether the highest completed education of either person is medium- or long-term further 
education  (the  reference  category  consists  of  individuals  with  vocational  or  short-term  further 
education). 
                                                 
8 Note that since I only look at first conviction, the sentences tend to be milder than if I also considered 
repeat offenders. 
 In the crime equation, I include the same list of variables as in the partnership formation analysis plus 
an  indicator  variable,  conviction  prior  to  partnership  start  that  takes  the  value  1  if  the  event  has 
occurred. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the data used in the partnership dissolution analysis are presented in Table 4. 
 
  Table 4 about here 
 
Men who have a partner commit less crime than single men. Compared to Table 3, the fraction of 
males who have been convicted is now around 3% measured at the moment of dissolution or when the 
sampling period ends. Clearly, this sample is also older, which might explain most of the difference. 
However,  as  pointed  out  by  e.g.  Sampson  et  al.  (2006),  partnerships  seem  to  protect  males  from 
committing crime. Again, most convictions are for property crimes, and the sentence is often fine or 
community service plus other sentences. Around 36% of the partnerships that begin in the sampling 
period end in dissolution. The mean length of partnerships is around 4 years. The average length of 
formal marriages in Denmark is around 7 years (Svarer, 2005). The inclusion of cohabiting unions, 
which are typically shorter, reduces the average length of partnerships. 
 
4  Empirical strategy 
 
In order to investigate the effect of being convicted on the exit rate to and from partnership, I use 
duration models. Since the occurrence of a conviction is potentially endogenous to the partnership 
process, the goal is to disentangle the selection effect from the causal effect. Since I have no good 
sources of exogenous variation in crime rates, I exploit the richness of the data in terms of detailed 
information on the timing of convictions and on marriage market events. Following Abbring and van den Berg (2003), I apply the so called timing-of-events model
9. That is, I estimate the process into and 
out of partnership simultaneously with the process of being convicted, allowing the processes to be 
interdependent through the unobservable heterogeneity terms. Below, I present the finer details of the 
timing-of-events model. In the partnership formation analysis, I look at a competing risks specification 
where  I distinguish between single males who join partnership  with females of different qualities. 
Specifically, I group females into two marriage market segments depending on the characteristics of 
their fathers.  In the partnership dissolution analysis,  I look at  a single  risk specification.  Below,  I 
present the basic model illustrated as a situation of partnership dissolution. After this I discuss the 
amendments for the partnership formation analysis. 
 
4.1  Timing-of-events method
10 
 
The timing-of-events method enables me to identify the causal effect of convictions on the exit rate 
from partnerships. The estimation strategy requires simultaneous modelling of the conviction rate and 
the  partnership  hazard.  Let  Tp(artnership)  and  Tc(onviction)  denote  the  duration  of  a  partnership  and  the 
duration  until  a  male  gets  convicted.  Both  duration  variables  are  continuous  nonnegative  random 
variables.  I  allow  them  to  interact  through  correlation  of  unobservables  and  through  a  possible 
treatment effect of getting convicted on the partnership hazard. I assume that all individual differences 
in the joint distribution of the processes can be characterized by observed explanatory variables, x, and 
unobserved  variables,  v.  The  occurrence  of  a  conviction  and  the  exit  rate  out  of  partnerships  are 
characterized by the moments at which they occur, and I am interested in the effect of the realization of 
Tc on the distribution of Tp. The distributions of the random variables are expressed in terms of their 
hazard rates hc(t|xc,t,vc) and hp(t|tc,xp,t,vp). Conditional on xp and vp, I can therefore ascertain that the 
                                                 
9 Notice that this identification strategy has been applied in a related situation where the goal is to 
estimate the causal effect of unemployment benefit sanctions on the exit rate from unemployment (see 
van den Berg et al. (2004), Abbring et al. (2005), Lalive et al. (2005), and Svarer (2007)). 
 
10 The basic model presented in this section corresponds to the model used by Lalive et al. (2005). 
 realization of Tc affects the shape of the hazard of Tp from tc onwards in a deterministic way. This 
independence assumption implies that the causal effect is captured by the effect of tc on hp(t|tc,xp,t,vp) 
for t>tc. This rules out that tc affects hp(t|tc,xp,t,vp) for t≤ tc i.e. anticipation of the conviction has no 
effect on the partnership dissolution hazard. This assumption could potentially be a bit strong in the 
context of convictions since trials normally are announced some time in advance, e.g. when the crime 
is detected and a charge is filed. However, the exact outcome of the trial is unknown since the accused 
might be found not guilty or the charges might be dropped. Abbring & van den Berg (2003) show that 
the assumption only requires that the exact date is not known - the agents are allowed to know the 
distribution of the timing. Furthermore, as noted by Abbring & van den Berg (2003), the time span 
between the moment at which the anticipation occurs and the moment of the actual sentence is short 
relative to the duration of relationships. This implies that the potential bias in the effect of convictions 
on the relationship hazard presumably is rather small. In addition, it is not obvious in the present 
context what kind of information that is available to the other marriage market participants. It might be 
natural to assume that it is easier to hide the filing of a charge than the conviction itself. Hence, the 
reactions to a conviction in terms of marriage market outcomes are likely to happen after the moment 
the conviction is given. 
 
Given  the  independence  and  no  anticipation  assumptions,  the  causal  effect  of  a  conviction  on  the 
partnership dissolution hazard rate is identified by a mixed proportional hazard model. That is, it is a 
product of a function of time spent in the given state (the baseline hazard), a function of observed time-
varying characteristics, xt, and a function of unobserved characteristics, v 
 
) , ( ) ( ) , | ( v x t v x t h t f l × =  
where λ(t) specified as exp(λm(t)) is the baseline hazard, and  ) , ( v xt f  is the scaling function specified as 
exp(β′xt+v). More specifically, the system of equations is: 
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Where xc, xp are vectors of possible time-varying covariates, D(tc)≡I(tc <t) is a time-varying indicator 
variable and vc and vp are unobserved heterogeneity terms. 
 
Intuitively, the timing-of-events method uses variation in partnership duration and in duration until a 
conviction  (conditional  on  observed  characteristics)  to  identify  the  unobserved  heterogeneity 
distribution. The selection effect is captured by the correlation between vc and vp, while the causal 
effect of the conviction on partnership duration is captured by the effect of the conviction conditional 
on the observables and vc and vp. 
 
The empirical model is non-parametrically identified without the use of instrumental variables on the 
basis of the mixed proportional hazard assumption (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003) and also on the 
basis  of  time-varying  explanatory  variables  (e.g.  Brinch,  2007).  It  is  possible  to  strengthen 
identification through various sources. One is the use of repeated spells (see e.g. van den Berg, 2001), 
however, in the present context this is not particularly attractive. First, in the partnership formation 
analysis  I  focus  on  the  time  until  first  partnership,  and  allowing  for  repeated  spells  requires  that 
conditional on observable characteristics, the unobserved heterogeneity terms of an individual do not 
change over time (see e.g. Roed & Westlie, 2007). This is problematic if partnership formation and 
partnership duration are affected by duration dependence and this is not appropriately addressed in the 
econometric model. Given the duration of most partnerships, my data is not rich enough to allow for 
careful  treatment  of  repeated  spells  of  singlehood  and  partnerships.  Second,  in  the  partnership 
formation  analysis  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  term  is  related  to  the  partnership  and  not  to  the 
particular person. It does not seem appropriate to assume a time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity 
term across different partnerships for a given person. 
 
4.2  Parametrization 
 
The baseline hazards, λp(t), λc(t), are specified as a piecewise constant hazard, where I divide the time 
line into a number of intervals. For all hazards, I divide the time line into M=3 intervals measured in days (0-1200, 1200-3600, 3600-), and I let λi(t) =( λi1(t),..., λi3(t)), i = partnership,conviction denote the 
estimated parameters in these intervals. 
 
I use a flexible and widely applied specification of the distribution of the unobservables; it is that each 
unobserved heterogeneity term follows a discrete distribution with only two mass-points. One of the 
mass-points  in  each  marginal  distribution  is  normalized  to  zero  so  ) , 0 (
2 1
c c c v v V = Î   and 
) , 0 (
2 1
p p p v v V = Î . This normalization is required as a consequence of the piecewise constant baseline 
specification. The correlation between Vc and Vp is important because this is the way in which this 
procedure allows selection on unobservables without a resulting bias in the estimates. The associated 
probabilities for all the possible combinations from the discrete distributions are defined as 
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where 0≤Pj≤1, j=1,2,3,4 and ∑j=1 Pj =1. For more details on this class of mixture distributions in 
duration models, see e.g. van den Berg (2001). 
 
The parameters are found by maximizing the corresponding log-likelihood function. 
 
4.3  Extension for partnership formation analysis 
 
In the partnership formation analysis, I also distinguish between the quality of partners as measured by 
their  fathers'  wealth,  income  and  level  of  education.  In  order  to  accommodate  this,  I  specify  a 
competing  risks  version  of  the  model  presented  above.  I  include  an  additional  random  variable, 
J={1,2}, which denotes the exit state from singlehood. Compared to the basic model this extension introduces an additional hazard function into partnership. The cause-specific hazard function for entry 
into partnerships takes the following form: 
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where hp=∑j=1,2 hp,j. This specification introduces a new unobserved heterogeneity term, which in line 
with the preceding specification is assumed to have two points of support. Hence, there are now eight 
possible combinations of the three unobserved heterogeneity distributions. 
 
5  Results 
 
In this section, I first present the results for the preliminary analysis where I look at the propensity to be 
in a partnership in a given year conditional on being convicted or not. In this analysis I do not address 
endogeneity of convictions. This is more carefully addressed in the two subsequent sections. Here I 
first present the results from the partnership formation analysis and then for the partnership dissolution 
analysis. For both of the latter analyses, I report how men who have been convicted of a crime are 
affected in the market for partnerships compared to men who have not been convicted. For various 
reasons, this comparison may be noisy. First, among those who are not convicted are potentially many 
criminals. In particular, these criminals might be the more talented criminals who are successful in their 
occupation and do not get caught and sentenced by the authorities. Second, the information about 
criminal behaviour might (or might not) be more visible to potential marriage partners than what is 
observed in the registers. I keep these complications in mind in the following. 
 
5.1  Partnership analysis 
 
In Table 5, I show the association between convictions and partnership status. The coefficients are from 
a fixed effect panel data model where the dependent variable equals 1 if the man is in a partnership in a 
given year and 0 otherwise.  
  Table 5 about here 
 
It is seen that being convicted is associated with a reduced probability of being in a partnership. In 
addition, there do not seem to be much difference between the association between different types of 
convictions or sentences or the partnership probability. This might be due to the finding reported in 
table 2 that many of those who receive are convicted for one crime is also convicted for other types of 
crimes. The final column in Table 5 reveals a negative association between the number of convictions 
and the partnership probability. 
 
5.2  Partnership formation analysis 
 
As a starting point, I present in Table 6 the results from a single risk partnership formation model. That 
is,  where  I  do  not  distinguish  between  the  quality  of  the  potential  partner,  but  only  consider  the 
transition from singlehood to partnership. This analysis reveals that being convicted does not affect the 
exit rate from singlehood into partnerships as such. This suggests that there is no obvious marriage 
market penalty for convicted men in the Danish marriage market. 
 
  Table 6 about here 
 
The other explanatory variables in the partnership hazard show that males who are older, who have a 
higher  income  and  are  not  unemployed  are  more  likely  to  form  partnerships.  These  results  are  in 
accordance with other studies on partnership formation (see e.g. Aassve et al. (2002) and Xie et al. 
(2003)). The unobserved heterogeneity terms (not shown) reveal a negative association between the 
unobserved heterogeneity terms in the partnership formation hazard and in the conviction hazard
11. 
                                                 
11  In  fact,  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  terms  are  perfectly  negatively  correlated.  In  order  to 
empirically identify the mass points and related probabilities, I had to restrict the correlation to be 
either 1, -1 or 0. It turned out that -1 gave the best fit in terms of likelihood value. That is, those who, based on unobservables, are less likely to form partnerships are more likely be 
convicted of a crime. This pattern works, in some sense, against the intuition provided in Section 2. 
Here I argued that a reason why men commit crime might be to attract women -- either by increasing 
their income and wealth or by signaling bravery and nerve. On the other hand, the males that are 
identified as criminal in the current analysis are those who get caught. This tentatively suggests that 
based on unobservable characteristics there is a group of men that are neither successful as criminals 
nor as marriage partners. Supporting evidence for this interpretation can be found in Mocan & Tekin 
(2006). Based on US data, they find that being very attractive reduces a young adult's (ages 18-26) 
propensity for criminal activity, and being unattractive increases it for a number of crimes. 
    In the conviction hazard, I find that males who are younger, unemployed and who come from poorer 
households have higher conviction rates. These findings are in accordance with the literature that looks 
at determinants of crime (see e.g. Levitt & Lochner (2001) and Imai et al. (2006)). In addition, there is 
a remarkably high rate of recidivism. The conviction hazard for those who were already convicted prior 
to their 18th birthday is more than 500% higher than for those who turned 18 with a clean record. 
 
To proceed, I present in Table 7 the results for a competing risks partnership formation analysis where I 
distinguish between female partners by the wealth level of their fathers
12. The first columns give the 
estimates for males who match with females who have a father with wealth belonging to the top 50% of 
the wealth distribution (measured in the year of partnership formation). Being convicted reduces the 
hazard rate into partnership with women from more wealthy families with 29% (exp(-0.35)-1=-29%)
13. 
In terms of forming partnerships with females from low wealth backgrounds, the incident of being 
convicted does not significantly affect the partnership formation rate. In sum, Tables 6 and 7 show that 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
12 To save space, I do not present the results for the analysis where I use level of education or income 
as quality proxies - the qualitative findings are similar to the results presented here. 
 
13 If I calculate the expected duration for a male with mean characteristics, the reduction in the hazard 
rate into partnerships with females from more wealthy families can be translated into approximately 1 
additional year of singlehood. This number is clearly sensitive to the chosen characteristics, but it gives 
an indication of the magnitude of the effect. 
 being convicted of a crime does not affect the rate at which young males form partnerships, but it 
reduces the rate at which they form partnerships with females from more successful backgrounds even 
after we condition on a number of other characteristics of the males. 
 
  Table 7 about here 
 
The earlier literature on the association between crime and partnership formation (e.g. Sampson & 
Laub (1993), Levitt & Lochner (2001), and Lopoo & Western (2005)) did not find strong effects of 
being convicted on subsequent partnership formation chances. The single risk results in the current 
analysis corroborate these earlier findings. The results presented in Table 7 therefore highlight the 
relevance of distinguishing between different types of partners as the results show that being convicted 
is associated with a reduced partnership formation rate with women from more well-off backgrounds. 
 
In Tables 8 and 9 (see appendix), I have investigated whether the effects of conviction on partnerships 
formation rates are affected by the type of committed crime and the sentence. It should be noted that 
the empirical model does not allow for causal interpretation of the crime or sentence specific effects 
since I do not model crime specific conviction rates in the current specification of the model. It is 
relatively easy to extend the econometric model to do this, but the low occurrence of some types of 
crime and sentences would lead to rather imprecise statistical estimates. Instead, I hold on to the model 
presented in the previous section and interpret the findings accordingly. 
 
Relating to type of crime, I find no association between violent crime and partnership rates, whereas 
property and other crime are negatively correlated with the formation of partnerships with females from 
well-off families. It should be noted that as shown in Table 2 many of those who are convicted for 
property crime will also get convicted for violent crimes at later stages. The timing of convictions is 
important for this part of the analysis and this may tend to bias the results. In relation to type of 
sentence,  the  results,  somewhat  surprisingly,  do  not  suggest  a  significant  penalty  of  mandatory  or 
suspended prison sentences. Most likely, this finding is due to the relatively low incidence of these 
sentences in the sample. Again, these relationships are not the main focus of the current investigation, and a richer data set and a more elaborate econometric model are required to make further progress in 
this direction. This is left for future work. 
 
5.3  Partnership dissolution analysis 
 
In Table 10, I present the results from the dissolution hazard model. 
 
  Table 10 about here 
 
Being convicted significantly increases the dissolution risk by around 76%. In terms of the length of 
the partnerships, a conviction reduces the expected duration for a couple with mean characteristics with 
around 2 years. There is accordingly a rather substantial marriage market penalty for being convicted of 
a crime. In the sense that being convicted of a crime signals reduced future income and hence provider 
potential the result corroborates other findings in the partnership dissolution literature that show that 
reduced income (e.g. Weiss & Willis (1997) and Svarer (2005)), higher levels of unemployment (e.g. 
Ahituv & Lerman (2005)) and increased sickness (e.g. Murray (2000)) for men increase the risk of 
partnership dissolution. Combining this finding with the results from the previous section indicates that 
although entry into partnerships is not reduced by a criminal record, exit is. There could be several 
reasonable  explanations  for  this  apparent  time  inconsistency.  On  the  more  anecdotal  level,  some 
women might get attracted by the traits of criminal men and believe that once they are protected by the 
partnership their destructive behaviour will stop. In many cases, this might be true (see e.g. Sampson et 
al. (2006)), but in relationships were criminal activities continue the women might realize that the 
deviation between expected and realised utility of the partnership is too large to keep the value of 
continuation above the value of the outside options. It might also be the case that females are more 
forgiven towards crime  committed when males are  younger. Another explanation might be, as the 
partnership formation analysis revealed, that criminal men are more likely to form partnership with 
females from less well-off and less educated families than with females from more well-off families. 
These women are more likely to be low educated themselves, and the increased dissolution risks might 
follow  from  the  sorting  of  low  educated  men  to  low  educated  women.  Although  the  partnership dissolution analysis tries to capture this by including levels of education and income of both partners, 
there  might  still  be  characteristics  of  the  partners  that  are  unobserved  in  the  analysis  which  are 
determinants of the partnership formation process and which positively affect the dissolution risk. 
 
In terms of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, I again find a negative correlation
14. That is, those who 
based on unobservable characteristics are more likely to end their partnership are less likely to get 
convicted. Based on the findings in the partnership formation analysis, this is somewhat unexpected. 
This implies that compared to a model where being convicted is treated as an exogenous event, the 
effect of conviction on dissolution risk presented in Tables 10-12 increases. In models where being 
convicted is treated as an exogenous variable, there is, however, also a positive association between 
conviction and dissolution risk. 
 
The findings for the remaining (control) variables in the dissolution hazards are in close accordance 
with previous analyses of dissolution risks (see e.g. Svarer & Verner (2008)). 
 
In Tables 11 and 12 (see appendix), I distinguish between different types of crime and sentences. 
Again, these findings can not be given a causal interpretation conditional on the econometric model. 
Still, all types of crime are associated with increased dissolution risks, and whereas the same is true for 
type of sentence, there is -- perhaps not surprisingly -- a remarkably higher dissolution risk if the 
sentence  leads  to  mandatory  prison.  In  Lopoo  &  Western  (2005),  it  is  found  that  men  who  are 
incarcerated face a higher divorce risk while they are in prison, but not afterwards. The present study 
also suggests that incarceration is associated with a significantly higher dissolution risk, but so are 
other sentences. The results shown in Table 10 that being convicted raises the dissolution hazard are 
therefore not driven solely by men who receive a mandatory prison sentence. 
 
                                                 
14 Again, I had to restrict the correlation to be either 1, -1 or 0 to obtain empirical identification. It 
turned out that -1 gave the best fit in terms of likelihood value. 
 5.4  Discussion and sensitivity analysis 
 
In the preceding sections, I have presented the results from an analysis where I have relied on empirical 
identification from a timing-of-events duration model that basically uses a functional form assumption, 
the proportional hazard formulation, as main ingredient to sort between selection and causal effect of 
being  convicted  of  a  crime  on  subsequent  success  in  the  marriage  market.  The  advantage  of  this 
identification strategy is that it uses the richness in the data in terms of timing of convictions and 
marriage market outcomes. In addition, the timing-of-events model has been shown to be quite robust 
to various misspecifications (Gaure et al. (2007)). However, as the analysis has shown, I needed to 
impose restrictions on the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity terms to obtain empirical 
identification, which of course questions the power of the estimates. It therefore seems appropriate to 
ask (1) what would the results have been if I had not addressed endogeneity of convictions, (2) are the 
findings sensitive to different specifications of the timing-of-events model, and (3) are there superior 
identification strategies that can be used given the available data. 
 
To address the first question, I have estimated models where I disregard the conviction hazard and 
hence treat the conviction dummy as an exogenous indicator variable. The findings from this model 
match the results presented in Tables 6, 7, and 10. That is, I find that convictions are not associated 
with  a  reduced  partnership  formation  rate  as  such,  but  the  rate  at  which  convicted  males  form 
partnerships with females from more well-off families is significantly reduced. In terms of dissolution 
risk,  I  also  find  that  convicted  men  are  more  likely  to  experience  a  split-up.  So  although  the 
introduction  of  the  conviction  hazard  improves  the  fit  of  the  model  and  changes  the  size  of  the 
coefficient  somewhat,  it  does  not  alter  the  main  conclusion.  This  suggests  that  either  allowing 
convictions to be endogenously related to the marriage market processes is not particular important or, 
perhaps  more  likely,  the  empirical  model  does  not  do  a  very  good  job  in  terms  of  determining 
convictions.  Recently,  Dills  et  al.  (2008)  summarized  the  last  40  years  of  economic  literature  on 
determinants  of  crime  and  concluded  that  economists  know  little  about  the  empirically  relevant 
determinants  of  crime.  Whether  this  conclusion  is  correct  or  not,  the  current  analysis  could  be 
interpreted along these lines. That is, the process that describes conviction is not very well determined, which  implies  that  caution  should  be  taken  when  giving  the  findings  in  this  study  a  causal 
interpretation. 
 
Related to the second question, I have experimented with different empirical specifications based on 
the timing-of-events model. So far it has not changed the overall conclusions. I have in particular 
looked at the following variations of the presented models: (1) a model where I follow all males from 
age 15 and therefore do not include indicators for pre marriage market convictions, (2) like the current 
analysis without information on previous convictions and education of mother, (3) a model where I 
include information on charges. That is, first I model the time until a charge is filed, and in addition I 
model the time from charge until (possible) conviction. 
 
As discussed in detail in Dills et al. (2008), economists have experimented with several strategies to 
determine crime including arrest and incarceration rates, police levels, abortion laws etc. While all of 
these have attractive explanations supporting their usefulness as crime instruments, they also share a 
common deficit in terms of predicting crime rates across time and regions. The identification strategy 
pursued in this article is new to the crime literature and is chosen based on features of the current data 
set, which is rich on conviction and marriage market dynamics, but not on exogeneous variation in 
conviction rates. Future research in this area would benefit from a combination of longitudinal data on 
crime and partnership dynamics and more suitable candidates to instrument crime. 
 
6  Concluding remarks 
 
This paper tests whether being convicted of a crime affects marriage market outcomes. The empirical 
strategy  exploits  a  data  set  that  is  very  rich  in  the  longitudinal  dimension  and  has  very  precise 
information on conviction dates and marriage market events. Based on a system of mixed proportional 
hazard models, the paper finds that convicted men do suffer in the marriage market. First, they can 
expect to marry females from less well-off families, and second they can expect to hold on to their 
spouses for a shorter period of time. It is clearly difficult to compare the costs of crime in the marriage 
market to the costs measured in the labour market in terms of reduced wages and lower employment. The finding of this paper, however, suggests that looking at the consequences of being convicted of a 
crime should also make room for how the marriage market is affected. 
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Table 1: Conviction statistics for partnership 
sample 
Variables:  Mean 
Criminal activities 
Conviction  0.1598 
-violent  0.0656 
-property  0.1174 
-other  0.0946 
Sentence 
Suspended sentence  0.0465 
Mandatory sentence  0.0525 
Fine  0.1227 
Other  0.0303 
Convitions 
1  0.0859 
2  0.0303 
3  0.0131 
4+  0.0230 
Number of individuals  10907 
 
 
Table 2: Fraction with multiple offences 
Convicted for: 
Also convicted for:  Property  Violence  Other criminal offence 
Property  0.52  0.47 
Violence  0.29  0.29 
Other  0.38  0.42   
  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for partnership formation sample 
Variables:  Mean     Std.dev 
Criminal activities 
Conviction  0.0987 
-violent  0.0193 
-property  0.0528 
-other  0.0266 
Sentence 
Suspended sentence  0.0165  0.1275 
Mandatory sentence  0.0068  0.0822 
Fine  0.0435  0.2039 
Other  0.0319  0.1756 
Individual characteristics 
Unemployment degree (fraction of year)  0.0468  0.1387 
Fraction that start partnerships  0.4912 
Mean age at partnership start  22.0877  3.0762 
Gross income (in 2003 DKK)  168781  120331 
Student  0.4367 
Working  0.4484 
Criminal before age 18  0.0385 
Males' characteristics 
Wealth father (in 2003 DKK)  415392  2088574 
Father is highly educated  0.3083 
Number of individuals  32170 
  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for partnership dissolution sample 
Variables:  Mean     Std.dev 
Criminal activities 
Conviction  0.030 
-violent  0.007 
-property  0.016 
-other  0.007 
Sentence 
Suspended sentence  0.005 
Mandatory sentence  0.004 
Fine  0.010 
Other  0.011 
Individual characteristics 
Age, male  24.943  5.260 
Age, female  23.570  5.514 
Children   0.640 
Working, male  0.756 
Working, female  0.767 
Male older (>4 years)  0.197 
Female older (>4 years)  0.060 
Gross income, male (in 2003 DKK)  290009  222685 
Gross income, female (in 2003 DKK)  197704  103862 
Formally married  0.314 
Low education, male  0.389 
High education, male  0.124 
Low education, female  0.487 
High education, female  0.155 
Males' characteristics 
Unemployment rate (fraction of a year)  0.050  0.150 
Wealth father (in 2003 DKK)  546245  2254364 
Father is highly educated  0.192 
Convicted prior to relationship start  0.212 
Relationship information 
Mean length of partnership (in years)  3.983  3.268 
Fraction of partnerships that dissolve  0.364  0.481 











Table 5: Probability of being in a partnership 
   Coeff.  Std err.  Coeff.  Std err.  Coeff.  Std err.  Coeff.  Std err. 
Convicted  -0.089  0.004 
1 conviction  -0.053  0.004 
2 convictions  -0.092  0.007 
3 convictions  -0.128  0.01 
4 or more convictions  -0.211  0.01 
Property  -0.073  0.005 
Violence  -0.088  0.006 
Other  -0.067  0.006 
Suspended sentence  -0.052  0.008 
Mandatory sentence  -0.083  0.008 
Fine  -0.071  0.005 
Other                    -0.076  0.009 
Note: Based on fixed effects model. Include controls for age, earnings, unemployment,  
employment status and fathers education and wealth 
 
 
Table 6 : Results from partnership formation analysis by hazard rates, criminal activity modelled 
Partnership  Conviction 
   Coeff  Std err     Coeff  Std err 
Criminal activities 
Conviction  -0.0426  0.0715 
Individual characteristics 
Unemployment degree (fraction of year)  0.3625  0.0822  1.458  0.1184 
Age  1.9722  0.1097  -0.9455  0.2038 
Gross income (in 2003 DKK)  2.1769  0.0657  -0.7433  0.3482 
Student  0.1705  0.0421  -0.6952  0.0639 
Working  0.2684  0.0415  -0.3024  0.0687 
Criminal before age 18 
 
1.8943  0.0572 
Parents' characteristics 
  Wealth father  -0.1893  0.0488  -0.5964  0.163 
Father is highly educated  -0.133  0.0324  -0.4157  0.0647 
Mother is highly educated  -0.2387  0.045 
Number of individuals  32170 
Note: To save space, estimates for baseline hazards and unobserved heterogeneity terms are not presented  
Bold figures denote significance at 5% level 
 Partner's father has
Coeff Std err Coeff Std err Coeff Std err
Criminal activities
Conviction -0.3462 0.0894 0.0922 0.0830
Individual characteristics
Unemployment degree (fraction of year) 0.2803 0.1209 0.5398 0.1348 1.5374 0.1178
Age 2.6902 0.1356 1.8691 0.1583 -1.1500 0.1993
Gross income (in 2003 DKK) 2.8651 0.1510 3.2618 0.1993 -0.5288 0.3279
Student 0.2995 0.0580 -0.0092 0.0640 -0.7630 0.0591
Working 0.3073 0.0581 0.1164 0.0643 -0.3700 0.0645
Criminal before age 18 1.9293 0.0528
Parents' characteristics
Wealth father -0.3560 0.0797 -0.5284 0.1109 -0.2950 0.1240
Father is highly educated -0.0903 0.0391 -0.2912 0.0469 -0.3475 0.0601
Mother is highly educated -0.2765 0.0424
Number of individuals
Note: To save space, estimates for baseline hazards and unobserved heterogeneity terms are not presented 
Bold figures denote significance at 5% level
32170
Conviction








Coeff Std err Coeff Std err Coeff Std err
Criminal activities
Violence -0.1120 0.1259 0.1316 0.1078
Property -0.3623 0.0828 -0.0040 0.0741
Other -0.5180 0.1288 0.0153 0.1038
Individual characteristics
Unemployment degree (fraction of year) 0.2932 0.1157 0.4952 0.1086 1.4521 0.1189
Age 1.5076 0.1106 1.1492 0.1093 -0.8684 0.2017
Gross income (in 2003 DKK) 2.6508 0.1910 2.8051 0.1960 -0.7028 0.3484
Student 0.3991 0.0605 0.0895 0.0550 -0.6893 0.0639
Working 0.3644 0.0610 0.1932 0.0554 -0.2952 0.0689
Criminal before age 18 1.9001 0.0573
Parents' characteristics
Wealth father -0.1761 0.0847 -0.2527 0.0588 -0.6336 0.1489
Father is highly educated -0.0289 0.0388 -0.1481 0.0391 -0.4196 0.0647
Mother is highly educated -0.2354 0.0450
Number of individuals
Note: To save space, estimates for baseline hazards and unobserved heterogeneity terms are not presented 
Bold figures denote significance at 5% level
32170
high wealth level low wealth level
Table 8: Results from competing risks partnership formation analysis by hazard rates, criminal activity modelled
Partnership Partnership Conviction
  
 Partner's father has
Coeff Std err Coeff Std err Coeff Std err
Sentence
Suspended sentence -0.1741 0.1416 -0.0889 0.1288
Mandatory sentence 0.1592 0.2023 0.2604 0.1924
Fine -0.3970 0.0976 0.0506 0.0852
Other -0.3962 0.1321 0.0878 0.1044
Individual characteristics
Unemployment degree (fraction of year) 0.2651 0.1159 0.5009 0.1085 1.4370 0.1188
Age 1.5854 0.1122 1.2065 0.1097 -1.1212 0.2020
Gross income (in 2003 DKK) 2.6440 0.1911 2.6876 0.1937 -0.5796 0.3481
Student 0.3842 0.0605 0.0888 0.0550 -0.7178 0.0640
Working 0.3503 0.0611 0.2025 0.0554 -0.3227 0.0690
Criminal before age 18 1.8901 0.0574
Parents' characteristics
Wealth father -0.2242 0.0838 -0.2249 0.0586 -0.6098 0.1568
Father is highly educated -0.0270 0.0390 -0.1512 0.0392 -0.4302 0.0648
Mother is highly educated -0.2309 0.0451
Number of individuals
Note: To save space, estimates for baseline hazards and unobserved heterogeneity terms are not presented 
Bold figures denote significance at 5% level
32170
high wealth level low wealth level
Table 9 : Results from competing risks partnership formation analysis by hazard rates, criminal activity modelled
Partnership Partnership Conviction




Age, male -0.130 0.035
Age, female -0.015 0.033
Gross income, male -0.779 0.076
Gross income, female -0.110 0.127
Working, male -0.152 0.021
Working, female -0.144 0.021
Formally married -1.798 0.038
Male older 0.206 0.028
Female older 0.378 0.042
Low education, male 0.188 0.019
High education, male -0.074 0.037
Low education, female 0.233 0.021
High education, female -0.171 0.037
Formally married -0.084 0.096
Children 0.146 0.046
Unemployment rate 1.126 0.146
Age -0.363 0.077
Gross income -3.136 0.266
Working -0.144 0.079
Low education 0.665 0.088
High education -0.655 0.259
Wealth father -0.488 5.563
Father is highly educated -0.682 0.126
Criminal before age 18 2.772 0.101
Number of couples
Note: To save space, estimates for baseline hazards and unobserved heterogeneity terms are not presented 
Bold figures denote significance at 5% level
Table 10: Results for partnership dissolution analysis
Dissolution Conviction
39370






Age, male -0.141 0.035
Age, female -0.006 0.033
Gross income, male -0.752 0.076
Gross income, female -0.102 0.127
Working, male -0.152 0.021
Working, female -0.139 0.021
Formally married -1.797 0.038
Male older 0.208 0.028
Female older 0.361 0.042
Low education, male 0.186 0.019
High education, male -0.071 0.037
Low education, female 0.234 0.021
High education, female -0.170 0.037
Formally married -0.042 0.096
Children 0.145 0.046
Unemployment rate 1.188 0.145
Age -0.413 0.077
Gross income -3.212 0.253
Working -0.124 0.079
Low education 0.646 0.087
High education -0.690 0.260
Wealth father -0.417 5.514
Father is highly educated -0.661 0.127
Criminal before age 18 2.770 0.101
Number of couples
Note: To save space, estimates for baseline hazards and unobserved heterogeneity terms are not presented 
Bold figures denote significance at 5% level
39370
Dissolution Conviction
Table 11: Results for partnership dissolution analysis
 Coeff. Std.dev Coeff. Std.dev
Sentence
Suspended sentence 0.555 0.118




Age, male -0.128 0.035
Age, female -0.016 0.033
Gross income, male -0.780 0.076
Gross income, female -0.115 0.127
Working, male -0.151 0.021
Working, female -0.143 0.021
Formally married -1.799 0.038
Male older 0.206 0.028
Female older 0.380 0.042
Low education, male 0.188 0.019
High education, male -0.073 0.037
Low education, female 0.233 0.021
High education, female -0.171 0.037
Formally married -0.036 0.096
Children 0.153 0.046
Unemployment rate 1.216 0.146
Age -0.414 0.077
Gross income -3.255 0.249
Working -0.131 0.079
Low education 0.646 0.088
High education -0.691 0.260
Wealth father -0.399 5.531
Father is highly educated -0.678 0.127
Criminal before age 18 2.774 0.101
Number of couples
Note: To save space, estimates for baseline hazards and unobserved heterogeneity terms are not presented 
Bold figures denote significance at 5% level
39370
Dissolution Conviction
Table 12: Results for partnership dissolution analysis  
 
 
 